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ON THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING CIVIL:
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CIVIL FORFEITURE
TERRANCE G. REED

I. INTRODUCTION

During the 1980s, law enforcement tuned with increasing frequency
to forfeiture as a means of enhancing existing methods of criminal law
enforcement. State and federal legislators have fostered this expansion by
broadening existing forfeiture laws in order to increase their usefulness to
law enforcement. This expansion of prosecutorial power, however, has
come under fire in the press and in the courts. Federal courts in
particular have become increasingly skeptical of the expansive use of the
forfeiture laws, and they have turned to the Constitution as a means of
injecting fairness and balance into a statutory forfeiture scheme that often
lacks both. This article addresses the growing constitutional limitations
on civil forfeiture.
Forfeiture laws date back to the beginning of the republic and before.
In fact, the forfeiture prosecution of John Hancock's ship, the schooner
Liberty, and the spirited defense of Hancock by the Boston criminal
defense lawyer John Adams would provide one of the sparks that led to
the American Revolution.1 Notwithstanding some early hostility to the
forfeiture practices of the Crown, forfeiture has been a widely accepted
federal enforcement tool since the first Congress. In recent years,
however, some states have enacted forfeiture laws so broad, that they
represent a significant departure from the last 200 years of forfeiture
jurisprudence.
Driven largely by legislators' understandable desire to eradicate drug
traffic, legislative expansions of forfeiture law sometimes have ignored the
historical purposes and limitations on the scope of forfeiture law. In
particular, some states have enacted forfeiture statutes which are nominally
labelled "civil" forfeitures but purport to impose broad forfeitures, which
have previously only been imposed upon convicted defendants as punitive
sanctions for criminal conduct after observance of the heightened
* Partner, Reed & Hostage, P.C.; Chair, American Bar Association RICO,
Forfeiture, and Civil Remedies Committee, Washington, D.C.
1. See generally John Adams, Argument and Report, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN
ADAMs 172-210 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). The celebrated trial
of John Hancock helped to unify the colonies in opposition to the practices of the British
Customs Commissioners and "to produce the single impulse against the courts which
increased steadily until its manifestation in the Declaration of Independence." Id. at 185.
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procedural protections of the criminal process. This article considers
what, if any, limitations the federal Constitution may place on the ability
of any government, state or federal, to seize a citizen's legitimate assets
in such a manner.
As one might expect with any set of laws that have been in existence
since 1790, federal courts have periodically addressed the limitations that
the Constitution places upon government efforts to subject assets to
forfeiture. Moreover, since 1790, the protections that the Constitution
generally affords those suspected of criminal activity have also evolved
considerably.
Accordingly, identifying what current limitations the
Constitution might impose upon the use of forfeiture laws requires a
historical analysis of both forfeiture law and the evolving balance between
the government's interests in law enforcement and citizens' rights.
This article first briefly discusses the historical and doctrinal origins
of forfeiture law in the United States.2
Then it discusses the
constitutional balance that the Supreme Court has reached over the years
between the government's interest in using forfeiture laws to further
enforcement objectives and the rights of citizens to be free from
unconstitutional seizures and deprivations of property.' After concluding
that a constitutionally significant difference exists between civil and
criminal forfeitures, the article addresses the Supreme Court's effort to
draw a constitutional dividing line between civil and criminal sanctions
generally and assesses its application to forfeiture law.4 Finally, the
article considers whether, in light of the constitutional differences between
civil and criminal sanctions generally, and civil and criminal forfeitures
specifically, the Constitution places any limits upon the government's
ability to subject legitimate assets to forfeiture in civil, as opposed to
criminal, proceedings. 5
II.

CRIMINAL VERSUS CIvIL FORFEITURE:

ORIGINS, RATIONALES, AND JUsTIFIcATIONs
Federal forfeiture legislation in the United States can be traced back
to the first session of Congress.6 Until 1970, however, all federal
2. See infra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 11-62 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 63-140 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 141-64 and accompanying text.
6. See Act of July 31, 1789, cl. 5, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 29, 41, 47; Act of Aug. 4,
1790, oh. 35, §§ 27, 46, 67, 1 Stat. 145, 163, 169, 176.

19941

CONS'I1TUTIONAL LIMIrATIONS

forfeitures were civil forfeitures; 7 that is, they were in rem proceedings
premised on the legal fiction that the forfeited property was guilty of an
offense and thereby became subject to seizure and forfeiture to the
government.8 The civil label attached to such procedures offered several
advantages for the government in its prosecution of such claims. Civil
forfeitures frequently have been characterized as remedial, 9 thereby
justifying a reduced burden of proof. Judicial acceptance of these
diminished procedural protections no doubt was facilitated by the legal
fiction that a piece of property, and not a citizen, was the subject of
government prosecution. In 1970, Congress enacted the first federal
criminal forfeiture law, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Unlike civil forfeiture, criminal
Organizations (RICO) statute.1°
forfeiture was justified as a criminal punishment imposed in a criminal in
personam proceeding directly against an individual offender for his
misconduct, not to an inanimate object through legal fiction. The
fundamental distinctions between these two forms of forfeiture-criminal
and civil-have both practical and legal significance for the government's
ability to impose forfeiture and the procedures by which such a forfeiture
action can be accomplished.

A. Civil Forfeiture: The Taint Theory and the Limits of Its Logic
Because most of the federal revenue during the early days of the
republic originated from duties and tariffs,"' duties and tariffs were the
first subjects of civil forfeiture legislation.12 Civil forfeitures have been
justified on a variety of grounds, but the earliest, and most practical,
7. See Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Proceduresof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 407 (1969) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (testimony of Deputy Attorney General
Kleindienst); see also S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1983); Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V
1993). For a general overview of the history of civil forfeiture law, see generally
Terrance G. Reed & Joseph P. Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Forfeitable "Interests," and
ProceduralDueProcess, 62 N.C. L. REV. 57, 59-69 (1983).
8. See The Palinyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827).
9. See, e.g., Glup v. United States, 523 F.2d 557, 561 (8th Cir. 1975) (discussing
18 U.S.C. § 924(d) forfeiture proceedings).
10. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 941
(codified as amended as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
11. During the early 1800s, customs duties provided approximately 70% to 80% of
federal revenue. See H.R. Doc. No. 33, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 712 (1960).
12. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 12, 29, 36, 1 Stat. 29, 39, 47.
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rationale was that they were needed "to guard the revenue laws from
abuse."13 Central to this early use of "civil" forfeiture as a customs
enforcement weapon was the limited scope of the resulting forfeiture.
Patterned largely after the earlier British Navigation Acts, which mandated
that goods be transported upon British ships with British crews, early
federal civil forfeiture statutes limited the scope of forfeiture to either the
unlawful cargo or the ship that transported it."' Similarly, under the
Navigation Act's imposition of severe, but circumscribed, liability, "the
ship was not only the source, but the limit, of liability." 5
The most persistent rationale for civil forfeiture laws, however, has
been the personification theory, under which inanimate objects are imbued
with a personality which is then held accountable for the violation of
applicable federal laws. 16 The classic formulation of the distinction
between civil and criminal forfeitures remains that of Justice Story, one
of the Supreme Court's most prolific early expositors of civil forfeiture
law. He observed:
It is well known, that at the common law, in many cases of
felonies, the party forfeited his goods and chattels to the crown.
The forfeiture did not, strictly speaking, attach in rem; but it was
a part, or, at least, a consequence, of the judgment of conviction.
It is plain, from this statement that no right to the goods and
chattels of the felon could be acquired by the crown, by the mere
commission of the offense; but the right attached only by the
conviction of the offender. The necessary result was, that in
every case where the crown sought to recover such goods and
chattels, it was indispensable to establish its right, by producing
the record of the judgment of conviction. In the contemplation of
the common law, the offender's right was not divested, until the
conviction. But this doctrine never was applied to seizures and
forfeitures, created by statute, in rem, cognisable on the revenue
side of the exchequer. The thing is here primarily considered as
the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the
13. United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398, 406 (1814)
(Story, J., dissenting).
14. See Reed & Gill, supra note 7, at 65-66; James R. Maxeiner, Note, Bane of
American ForfeitureLaw-Banished at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768, 774 (1977).
15. OLIvER W. HoLMEs, JR., THE COMMON LAW 7 (Little, Brown & Co. 1923)
(1881).
16. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719-20
(1971); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827); HOLMES, supra note 15, at 2629.
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thing; and this, whether the offence be malum prohibitum, or
malum in se. 1
The personification fiction, as originally described in Justice Story's
opinion, has guided the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis of

forfeiture law since then, although the vitality of this fiction has been
eroded by the Court."8 As a result of this fiction, courts have regarded
the owner's innocence as irrelevant because the forfeiture action was
deemed as an action against the res, not its owner. 9 Historically, then,

civil forfeitures were justified under a theory of taint.

That is, the

forfeitable object had become tainted by its unlawful use. As described
by Justice Story, when property held in a forfeiture proceeding is found
to have not been used in violation of the law, "the taint of forfeiture is

completely removed, and cannot be re-annexed to it.'
After the Civil War, the Supreme Court confronted the distinction
between civil and criminal forfeitures in Miller v. United States.2 ' At

issue in the Miller case was the constitutionality of in rem legislation,
commonly known as the Confiscation Acts, passed by Congress during the
Civil War, which authorized the forfeiture of property owned by
Confederate soldiers and supporters.' Miller, the plaintiff and property

owner, objected to this forfeiture on the grounds that the purpose of the
Act was to punish the criminal offense of treason, but the civil in rem
proceedings failed to afford the owner the constitutional protections of
The
indictment and due process guaranteed by the Constitution.'
Supreme Court noted that if the legislation constituted "municipal

regulations only, there would be force in the objection that Congress has
17. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added). Courts generally overlook the
fact that Justice Story reached the opposite conclusion in his earlier dissent in 1960 Bags
of Coffee, 12 U.S. at 405-16. As to innocent purchasers of forfeitable goods without
notice of their tainted character, Justice Story had found the argument for forfeiture
"monstrous." Id. at 416. Further, he could "foresee that great embarrassments will
arise to the commercial interests of the country; and no man, whatever may be his
caution or diligence, can guard himself from injury and perhaps ruin." Id. at 406.
18. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
19. Id. at 685 (relying on the rationale that the thing is primarily considered as the
offender to sustain the statutory forfeiture of a vessel found to have been engaged in
piracy, even though the innocence of owner had been fully established).
20. Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 245, 318 (1818); see also 1960 Bags of
Coffee, 12 U.S. at 406 (Story, J., dissenting) (describing "the secret taint of forfeiture"
attaching to goods used in violation of customs laws).
21. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1870).
22. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, § 5, 12 Stat. 589, 590.
23. Miller, 78 U.S. at 304.
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disregarded the restrictions of the fifth and sixth amendments of the
Constitution."'
The Court upheld the legislation, however, by
concluding that the statutes "were not enacted under the municipal power
of Congress to legislate for the punishment of crimes against the
sovereignty of the United States,"' but rather pursuant to the legitimate
exercise of Congress's war power authority.' In a memorable dissent,
Justice Field took issue with the majority's characterization of the
Confiscation Acts as falling within Congress's broad war powers.'
Justice Field argued that the legislative history of the Acts revealed that
their real purpose was to punish those guilty of treason.' So construed,
the Acts were unconstitutional because they purported to impose
punishment upon the owner for treason without observing the
constitutional requirements incident to a criminal prosecution.' In so
concluding, Justice Field quoted Court precedent stating that confiscations
of property "are punitive" and do not punish "an offending thing, but are
inflicted for the personal delinquency of the owner.., and punishment
should be inflicted only upon due conviction of personal guilt."'
Justice Field went on to make two observations that have lasting
relevance to forfeiture law. First, he described the critical doctrinal
limitation of civil forfeiture to property that can itself be characterized as
an offender:
[If] proceedings in rem for the confiscation of property could be
sustained, without any reference to the uses to which the property
is applied, or the condition in which it is found, but whilst, so to
speak, it is innocent and passive, and removed at a distance from
the owner and the sphere of his action, on the ground of the
personal guilt of the owner, all the safeguards provided by the
Constitution for the protection of the citizen against punishment,
without previous trial and conviction, and after being confronted
by the3 witnesses against him, would be broken down and swept
away. 1

24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.

Id.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 319 (Field, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 321 (Field, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 322 (Field, J., dissenting).
30. Id. (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting The Amy Warwick, 1 F. Cas. 808 (D. Mass.
1862) (No. 343)).
31. Id. at 322-23 (Field, J., dissenting).
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In short, Justice Field identified the tainted character of property-its
guilt, that is, its direct use in criminal activity-as a constitutional
limitation on the scope of civil, in rem forfeiture. Additionally, he went
on to describe the radical consequences of failure to adhere to this
important distinction:
[I]t would sound strange to modem ears to hear that proceedings
in rem to confiscate the property of the burglar, the highwayman,
or the murderer, were authorized, not as a consequence of their
conviction upon regular criminal proceedings, but without such
conviction, upon ex parte proof of their guilt, or upon the
assumption of their guilt from the failure to appear to a citation,
published in the vicinage of the property, or posted upon the
doors of the adjoining court-house, and which they may never
have- seen. It seems to me that the reasoning, which upholds the
proceedings in this case, works a complete revolution in our
criminal jurisprudence, and establishes the doctrine that
proceedings for the punishment of crime against the person of the
offender may be disregarded, and proceedings for such
punishment be taken against his property alone, or that
proceedings may be taken at the same time both against the
person and the property, and thus a double punishment for the
same offence be inflicted.'
For present-day purposes, the significance of Miller lies in the point
of apparent agreement between the majority opinion and Justice Field's
dissent. Both the majority and Justice Field agreed that the Constitution
forbids the enactment of forfeiture legislation aimed at imposing
punishment for a property owner's offense without affording the due
process protections secured by the Constitution for criminal
prosecutions.33 That a majority of the Court would, during the
Reconstruction Era, strain to uphold the Confiscation Acts as a permissible
exercise of Congress's war powers should not be surprising. That the
Court felt constrained to do so is a testament to the strength of the
constitutional arguments mustered by Justice Field.
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Court again attempted to
reconcile the requirements of the Bill of Rights with accepted practice
under the federal civil forfeiture statutes. In Boyd v. United States,34 the
Supreme Court held that a customs forfeiture statute, authorizing the
32. Id. at 323 (Field, J., dissenting).
33. For the majority's discussion, see id. at 304-05. For Justice Field's discussion,
see id. at 323 (Field, J., dissenting).
34. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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seizure of evidence in support of a forfeiture claim, abridged the
constitutional protections of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 5 More
important, the Court rejected the argument that such civil forfeitures were
civil proceedings not within the reach of the safeguards of either
amendment for criminal proceedings.' According to the Court in Boyd,
"proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a
man's property by reason of offences committed by him, though they may

be civil in form, are in their nature criminal."'

The Court concluded

that "suits for penalties and forfeitures, incurred by the commission of
offences against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature," and, therefore,
were subject to the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
seizures and the Fifth Amendment's protection against compelled selfincrimination.38
The Boyd opinion created a new niche for nominally "civil" forfeiture
laws: they would not be considered wholly civil or criminal, but rather
would occupy the middle ground of "quasi-criminal." After Boyd, the
government could no longer contend that the personification fiction
eliminated all constitutional protections. Instead, courts began the task of
selectively identifying which constitutional rights applicable to criminal
proceedings would apply equally to civil forfeiture actions.
This process of selective incorporation continues to this day. For
example, federal courts grappled for years with the question of whether
the Eighth Amendment applies to civil forfeiture actions 9 until the
Supreme Court decided this issue in the affirmative in Austin v. United
States.'
Of course, Boyd and its progeny did not address which
constitutional protections would apply to a truly criminal forfeiture, that
is, one imposed as a direct result of an owner's criminal deed. Criminal
35. Id. at 634. The statute at issue was Act of June 22, 1874, § 12, 18 Stat. 186.
36. Id. at 633-34.
37. Id. at 634.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., United States v. 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d 396, 401 (3d
Cir. 1990) (holding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable to a forfeiture under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7) because the statute was intended to be a civil remedy, not a criminal
punishment); United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543 (4th Cir. 1989) (same);
United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232, 234 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding the
proportionality requirement of the Eight Amendment inapplicable to in rem civil
forfeiture proceedings under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (7)); cert. denied, 493 U.S. 954
(1989). But see United States v. 3639 2d St., N.E., 869 F.2d 1093, 1098 (8th Cir.
1989) (Arnold, J., concurring) ("We are not today foreclosing the possibility that a given
use of the forfeiture statutes may violate the excessive fiees clause of the Eighth
Amendment.").
40. 113 S.Ct. 2801 (1993).
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forfeiture
would not appear on the federal statutes until much later, in
1970.41
Though it is an unusual legal doctrine, the taint rationale for civil
forfeitures has survived to this day. The Supreme Court has repeatedly,
if begrudgingly, upheld civil forfeitures over facial constitutional
challenges. For example, in J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United
States,42 the Supreme Court observed:
If the case were the first of its kind, it and its apparent paradoxes
might compel a lengthy discussion to harmonize the [forfeiture]
section with the accepted tests of human conduct. Its words taken
literally forfeit property though the owner of it did not participate
in or have knowledge of the illicit use. There is strength,
therefore, in the contention that, if such be the inevitable meaning
of the section, it seems to violate that justice which should be the
foundation of due process of law required by the Constitution..
. . And it follows, is the contention, that Congress only intended
to condemn the interest the possessor of the property might have
to punish his guilt, and not to forfeit the title of the owner who
was without guilt.
Regarded in this abstraction the argument is formidable, but
there are other and militating considerations.'
The Court in Goldsmith-Grantwent on to justify such an anomalous
and counter-intuitive result by reference to the need to protect federal
revenue, to common law deodand doctrine, and to the Bible." Finally,
the Court relied on nineteenth-century precedent, including Justice Story's
opinion in The Palmyra, which upheld such forfeitures against innocent
owners because "the thing is primarily considered the offender." 45
In the past, the taint theory often was used as a justification for
upholding civil forfeiture laws. Today, however, its logic may actually
place some limits on the scope of civil forfeiture, which largely went
unexamined until the recent spate of legislative and law enforcement
41. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 941
(codified as amended as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
42. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).

43. Id. at 510.
44. Id. at 510-11.
45. Id. at 511 (citing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 7 (1827)).
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efforts to expand the reach of civil forfeiture law beyond a taint
justification.'
B. Criminal Forfeiture and Its Origins:
The Abandonment of Taint as a Limitation Upon Forfeiture
In 1970, Congress enacted what it believed to be the first federal

"criminal" forfeiture law when it passed the RICO Ace 7 and the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise drug statute." Unlike civil forfeitures,
criminal forfeitures are considered to be part of a criminal prosecution,"
are punitive,' and can only be imposed after a conviction,51 Criminal
46. Federal courts have rejected government efforts to expand civil forfeiture
beyond tainted property. In United States v. 1980 Rolls Royce, 905 F.2d 89 (5th Cir.
1990), for example, the Fifth Circuit rejected a claim by the government for the
forfeiture of a tract of real estate and an automobile. The government had brought a
civil forfeiture action seeking forfeiture of these items as the "proceeds" of drug
violations under the now ubiquitous "proceeds" forfeiture provisions of 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(6). The government argued that "if one dollar of drug money was used to
purchase an asset, the entire asset is forfeitable." Id. at 90. The court rejected this
argument and held that the government was entitled to forfeit only those portions of the
two properties that reflected the invested, tainted proceeds of drug violations or
derivative profits, but not the portions derived from legitimate sources. Id. In Rolls
Royce, the Fifth Circuit quoted with approval language from the First Circuit's opinion
in United States v. Pole No. 3172, 852 F.2d 636 (1st Cir. 1988), which rejected the
argument that "forfeitability spreads like a disease from one infected mortgage payment
to the entire interest in the property acquired prior to the payment." Id. at 639-40.
47. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat.
941-48 (codified as amended as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see Senate Hearings,supra note 7,
at 407 (testimony of Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst); S. REP. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1983) ("From [1790] until 1970 there was no criminal forfeiture
provision in the United States Code."). See generally Reed & Gill, supra note 7, at 5969.
48. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1236, 1265 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
49. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 advisory committee's note to 1972 amendment.
50. See OrganizedCrime Control:Hearingson S. 30 andRelatedProposalsBefore
Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Judiciary Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1969)
(statement of sponsorSen. McClellan); United States v. Lizza Indus., 775 F.2d 492,498
(2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d
975, 992 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 439 U.S. 810 (1978). But c. Caplin
& Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (suggesting that criminal forfeiture
may also serve restitutionary goals). Cf. Terrance G. Reed, The Defense CaseforRICO
Refonr, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691, 703-04 (1990) (rebutting suggestion of restitutionary
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forfeitures have a long lineage52 and can be traced to feudal practices in

England,'

but they had been disfavored in colonial America.'

In contrast to civil forfeiture laws, which are premised on a taint

theory, criminal forfeitures are premised on a punitive theory, whereby
forfeiture serves the important penal interests associated with the criminal
process.5' As the Fifth Circuit observed in upholding a substantial
criminal forfeiture:

guilty."'

"property forfeited under RICO need not be

Rather, the scope of criminal forfeiture is measured by the

penal objectives of the legislature.57 With RICO, for example, Congress

authorized the forfeiture of assets, either legitimately or illegitimately
acquired, which afford a defendant a source of influence over a
business.58 Accordingly, courts have readily applied RICO's broad
forfeiture language to encompass legitimately acquired assets to further

Congress's goal of eliminating the economic influence of racketeers over
legitimate businesses.-' Thus, in many respects, criminal forfeiture is
broader in scope than civil forfeiture because law enforcement can reach
assets that were legitimately acquired or lawfully used. Courts have
entertained Eighth Amendment challenges to such broad criminal
forfeitures,' and some have observed that Eighth Amendment concerns
are most acute when the government seeks to forfeit such untainted assets
goal for criminal forfeiture).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1348, reh'g denied, 714
F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
52. See generally Reed & Gill, supranote 7, at 60.
53. See 2 FREDERICK PoLLocK & FRnnmuc W. MAuAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 466 (2d ed. 1968); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COmmENTARiES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1300, at 178-80 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1st ed. 1833).
See generallyTerranceG. Reed, CriminalForfeitureUnderthe ComprehensiveForfeiture
Act of 1984: Raising the Stakes, 22 AM. CUM. L. REv. 747, 748 n.9 (1985).
54. See 1 STORY, supra note 53, §§ 163-65, at 186-97; Reed & Gill, supra note 7,
at 61.
55. See Reed & Gill, supra note 7, at 61; see also United States v. Kravitz, 738
F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
56. Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1350; accordUnited States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1413
(9th Cir. 1987) (holding that RICO "forfeiture is not limited to those assets of a RICO
enterprise that are tainted by use in connection with racketeering activity").
57. See Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1346.
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
59. See Busher, 817 F.2d at 1413; Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1350; United States v.
Marubeni Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 769 n.12 (9th Cir. 1980).
60. See, e.g., Alexanderv. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993); United States v.
McKeithen, 822 F.2d 310, 314-15 (2d Cir. 1987); Busher, 817 F.2d at 1413.
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under a purgative rationale such as that found in RICO." One respected
commentator even has urged that the criminal forfeiture of untainted
property violates the Eighth Amendment.'
The focus of this article,
however, is not whether the government can obtain the forfeiture of
untainted assets through criminal procedures with their manifold
safeguards, but whether the government can subject to forfeiture untainted
assets through civil procedures and especially through that peculiar
variation of civil procedures common to many civil forfeiture statutes.
C. A Brief Comparison of Civil and Criminal ForfeitureProcedures
Just as civil and criminal forfeitures have distinct legal ancestries and
purposes, the procedures used to perfect each type of forfeiture are
dramatically different. The most obvious difference, of course, is that
criminal forfeitures are considered a part of a criminal prosecution and
thus are subject to criminal procedural rules, whereas civil forfeitures are
prosecuted in independent civil actions directly against offending
property."
Civil forfeitures are considered in rem proceedings, and a court must
take possession of property through an act of seizure by the government
before it can assert in rem jurisdiction.'
The typical civil forfeiture
action begins with a seizure of property and is followed by the filing of
a forfeiture complaint and the prosecution of the government's claim. In
many senses, the raison d'etre of civil forfeitures lies in their reduction of
the government's burden for a successful prosecution.' Federal courts
have further reduced the government's burden by, in effect, shifting the
burden of proof from the government/plaintiff to the claimant/defendant
61. See United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 663 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1034 (1989); United States v. Regan, 726 F. Supp. 447, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1989),
aff'd in part, vacatedin part, 937 F.2d 823, decision amended, 946 F.2d 188 (2d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2273 (1992).
62. See William W. TayloriHI, The ProblemofProportionalityin RICO Forfeitures,
65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 885, 894 (1990).
63. See generally United States v. Seifuddin, 820 F.2d 1074, 1076-77 (9th Cir.
1987).
64. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492,
503 (1993) (citing cases). Civil forfeitures are in rem proceedings initiated by seizure
of the res, either actual or constructive, which confers in rem jurisdiction upon the court.
See Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 294 (1870); The Brig Ann, 13 U.S.
(9 Cranch) 289 (1815) (Story, J.); United States v. $84,740, 900 F.2d 1402, 1404 (9th
Cir. 1990); United States v. $10,000, 860 F.2d 1511, 1513 (9th Cir. 1988); see also
DAVID B. SMrrH, PROSECuTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFETURE CASES

65. See generally Reed & Gill, supra note 7, at 65-66.

9.01[2] (1994).
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for a wide variety of federal civil forfeitures.'

Moreover, federal courts

have held that federal prosecutors need not comply with evidentiary rules

in furnishing evidence to support a civil forfeiture; for example, a

forfeiture judgment can be obtained through hearsay.67
Criminal forfeitures, on the other hand, are in personam actions
against a criminal defendant, and thus the only prerequisite to court
jurisdiction is obtaining jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The
burden of proof in a criminal forfeiture case is, however, allocated to the

government. As previously mentioned, a criminal conviction is a
necessary predicate for any criminal forfeiture. s Moreover, as in all
criminal cases, the government's burden of persuasion is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.' Some federal courts have held that the government's
burden of proof as to the forfeitability of assets in some types of criminal
forfeiture prosecution, as opposed to the burden of proving a defendant's
guilt, is only a preponderance of the evidence.'
The better rule,
however, and the only one endorsed by Congress, is that the government
must shoulder
the more stringent burden of proof beyond a reasonable
71
doubt.
66. See, e.g., United States v. $250,000, 808 F.2d 895, 900 (1st Cir. 1987); SMITH,
supra note 64, 11.03.
67. United States v. 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named the Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 128384 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d 725, 728,
reh'g denied, 696 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983); United
States v. 1974 Porsche 911-S, 682 F.2d 283, 286 (1st Cir. 1982).

68. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e) (1988).
69. See United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 90406 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that
under RICO, the government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there is a
nexus between the criminal conduct and the property to be forfeited); United States v.
Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1518, 1521 (E.D. Va. 1987), af'd, 900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 924 (1990).
70. United States v. Elgersma, 971 F.2d 690, 694-97 (lth Cir. 1992) (forfeiture
under 21 U.S.C. § 853); United States v. Smith, 966 F.2d 1045, 1050-53 (6th Cir. 1992)

(same).
71. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1467(e)(1) (1988) (requiring the government to meet the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden for criminal forfeitures in federal obscenity
prosecutions); see also H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 38 (1984)
(adopting the Justice Department's request for language that criminal forfeiture must be
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ASSET
FoR,FErrmUI OFmE, FORFEITURE: VOLUME 1; INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL STATUTEs 36
(1984) (observing that criminal, unlike civil, forfeitures must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt); SfmrrH, supra note 64, 14.03.
Compare United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1987) (preponderance
sufficient) with United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1235 n.5 (7th Cir.) (applying
beyond-reasonable-doubtstandard), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1030 (1990); Pryba, 674 F.
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In any event, the federal rules of criminal procedure and evidence
apply to criminal forfeiture prosecutions, and they provide specific
procedural protections, such as the requirement that the allegedly
forfeitable assets be identified in the indictment and in a special verdict
from the jury.'
Moreover, although Congress has enacted statutory
provisions authorizing the issuance of pretrial restraining orders in
appropriate cases prior to conviction, the government is generally not
entitled to seize allegedly forfeitable assets in a criminal forfeiture action
prior to a judgment.
In addition, Congress in 1984 significantly
modified criminal forfeiture procedures by providing for specific post-trial
procedures to permit third parties to exempt their property from a criminal
forfeiture verdict.7'
In sum, the procedural protections afforded by statute to property
owners in federal criminal forfeiture actions are much greater than those
available to property owners in civil forfeiture actions. The potential
scope of forfeiture is much greater in a federal criminal forfeiture
prosecution, however, than that permitted in a federal civil forfeiture
proceeding. The principal limitation that distinguishes the scope of federal
civil forfeitures from that of federal criminal forfeitures is the taint
doctrine: civil forfeitures are traditionally limited to property actually used
to violate the law, whereas criminal forfeitures can include lawfully
acquired and used property. Accordingly, Congress's provision of greater
procedural protections for federal criminal forfeiture actions is consistent
not only with the "criminal" label attached to such proceedings, but also
with the general purpose of such proceedings: to impose punishment even
if it means confiscating wholly legitimate property.

Supp. 1504 (same). Sandini can be construed as applicable only to forfeiture
prosecutions under 21 U.S.C. § 853(d), which authorizes the government to prove
forfeiture under a rebuttable presumption of forfeiture. The Advisory Committee notes
to Rule 31(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure state that the assumption is
that criminal forfeiture is an "element of the offense to be alleged and proved." FED.
R. CRlM. P. 31 advisory committee's note to 1972 amendment. Contra United States
v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1577-78 (9th Cir. 1989).
72. See, e.g., FED. R. CUM. P. 7(e)(2), 31(e), 32(b)(2); see also United States v.
Seifuddin, 820 F.2d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 1987).
73. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1988); see United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d
359, 362-65 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that criminal forfeiture statutes do not allow pretrial
restraint of substitute assets).
74. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(0(2) (1988). See generallyReed, supranote 53, at 769-
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D. Civil Forfeiture Today
During the 1980s and early 1990s, federal and state law enforcement
officials embraced forfeiture as a valuable tool in their battle with crime.
In fiscal year 1993 alone, for example, the federal government seized
approximately $1.9 billion in assets for forfeiture.'
The dramatic
increases in the number and size of forfeitures, however, largely has not
been accompanied by significant improvements in the procedures or
protections available to prevent erroneous or unfair forfeitures. To the
contrary, during the 1980s and early 1990s, the Department of Justice has
taken an active role in opposing procedural or substantive reform of the
civil forfeiture laws. This intransigence on the part of the Department of
Justice led to a string of Supreme Court opinions in the early 1990s that,
in the process of rejecting Department of Justice positions, also have
narrowed the forfeiture laws.
The first such opinion, United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue,76
was a statutory construction case, but one that had obvious constitutional
overtones. The Department of Justice sought review by the Supreme
Court to sustain its contention that the relation back doctrine, a legal
fiction which posits that the government obtains title to forfeitable property
at the time the property is used unlawfully, took precedence over
Congress's enactment of an innocent owner exemption from forfeiture.'
According to the Department of Justice, the relation-back doctrine, as
codified in the federal drug civil forfeiture statute, 8 operated to vest title
to forfeitable property in the government at the time of the alleged
offense, such that any person who subsequently purchased or was given
title to the property did not, in fact, obtain good title.79 In short, the
Department of Justice contended that even wholly innocent owners can
lose their property to forfeiture if, at some distant time in the past, the
75. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR AssET FORFErrURE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DEPARThMENT OF JuSTICE ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR

1993, at 20 (1994).
76. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
77. See id. at 1134; 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988) (authorizing forfeiture of proceeds
of illegal drug transactions except "to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason
of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted
without the knowledge or consent of that owner").
78. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988) (providing that "[a]ll right title and interest in
property [subject to forfeiture] shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act
giving rise to forfeiture under this section").
79. See 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1134-35.
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property had become forfeitable because of acts of another, thereby giving
the government superior title to the property."
The Supreme Court disagreed and construed the relation-back doctrine
as not coming into effect until after a forfeiture judgment was entered,8"
thereby granting standing to all property transferees who seek to establish
their entitlement to an innocent owner exemption. The Court's ruling,
unlike the department's position, made sense and was consistent with the
expressed congressional intent to protect innocent property owners.2
In 92 Buena Vita Avenue, the Department of Justice basically asked
the Court to recognize that the department had the authority to forfeit the
property of innocent owners. To make matters worse, the department
sought to belittle the impact of such a harsh ruling by contending that it
would use this power sparingly because it could always decide to remit or
mitigate forfeitures. If, however, the Supreme Court accepted this
argument, the Court would have left open the troubling question of how
the Department of Justice would decide which "innocent owners" deserved
forfeiture, and which did not. The department's advocacy of doctrinal
purity, bottomed on anachronistic forfeiture dogma, undoubtedly cost the
department points with the Court.
On the heels of 92 Buena Vista Avenue, the Court issued the Austin
opinion, in which the Court recognized that civil forfeitures can constitute
punishment within the meaning of the Constitution, and that excessive
forfeitures can constitute punishment that violates the Eighth
Amendment.'
Once again, the Justice Department took the hard line
and based its argument on old forfeiture doctrine. The department
contended that because drug forfeitures are "civil" in name they are not
subject to the protections of the Eighth Amendment against excessive
fines."
The bottom line for the Department of Justice was that civil
forfeitures can never be so large as to trigger constitutional8 6 protection
against disproportionate punishment.' The Court disagreed.
In Austin, the Supreme Court found that civil forfeiture statutes
generally, and the drug forfeiture statute specifically at issue," were
historically considered punitive.88 The Court then applied to the drug
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See id.
Id. at 1136.
See id. at 1136-37.
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993).

Id. at 2804.
See id.
See id. at 2804-05.
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
88. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2808-11.
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forfeiture statute the constitutional standard it had crafted four years
earlier in United States v. Halper" for determining whether imposition
of a civil sanction after a criminal conviction was sufficient to trigger the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' Thus, the "'civil
sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but
rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes, is punishment as we have come to understand the term.'" 91
Applying this standard, the Austin Court concluded that the drug civil
forfeiture statute was "punitive" for purposes of triggering the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on excessive fines, notwithstanding its potential
remedial purposes.'
The Austin opinion acknowledged that the Court had, in the past,
selectively applied constitutional protections to civil forfeitures,
incorporating some protections of the Bill of Rights which are equally
applicable to criminal prosecutions, while not incorporating others.'
The Court expressly rejected the government's contention that a civil
sanction must be "so punitive that it must be considered criminal" before
constitutional protections would apply.' Implicitly, therefore, the Court
in Austin placed the drug civil forfeiture statute at issue into the same
middle-tier "quasi-criminal" category that was previously created for civil
forfeitures a century earlier in Boyd v. United States.' Nonetheless, the
Court observed that "even those protections associated with criminal cases
may apply to a civil forfeiture proceeding if it is so punitive that the
proceeding must reasonably be considered criminal."9
In addition, the Austin Court gave notice that the power of the "guilty
property" personification fiction to eliminate the relevance of a property
owner's innocence in a civil forfeiture proceeding was now a debatable
issue.' In stating that the Court had previously reserved ruling on this
question," the Court in Austin ignored other arguably dispositive
89. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
90. See Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2806.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. (quoting Harer,490 U.S. at 448) (emphasis added).
See id. at 2811-12.
Id. at 2804 n.4.
Id. at 2804 (referring to Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)).
116 U.S. 616 (1886); see supranotes 34-38 and accompanying text.
Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2804 n.4.
See id. at 2808.
Id. at 2809.
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precedent from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' and narrowly
construed its past precedent as merely "rejecting the 'innocence' of the
owner as a common-law defense to forfeiture."' °0 Instead, the Court

signaled its departure from historical forfeiture rationale by simply noting
that "the more recent cases have expressly reserved the question" whether

civil forfeiture can be imposed upon the "truly innocent owner. " 101
Subsequently,

in United States v. James Daniel Good Real

Property, 02 the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment requires the government to provide notice and an adversarial
judicial hearing to realty owners before they can be dispossessed by a

seizure for purposes of initiating civil forfeiture proceedings." °3 Again,
in Good, the Supreme Court sought to place some distance between
current forfeiture analysis and historical justifications for forfeiture
practices. The Court concluded that "[j]ust as the urgencies that justified

summary seizure of property in the 19th Century had dissipated by the
lime of Phillips, neither is there a plausible claim of urgency today to
justify the summary seizure of real property under § 881(a)(7)." °4

In the wake of 92 Buena Vista Avenue, Austin, and Good, it seems
clear that the government's continued reliance upon historical, if not

anachronistic, forfeiture rationales will not provide it with a firm basis
upon which to defend its forfeiture practices.

Rather, these opinions

reflect a growing judicial awareness that the plethora of legal fictions and
convenient procedures that have made civil forfeiture so attractive to law
enforcement must ultimately be reconciled with the evolving protections

of the Constitution. In short, the days of the pirates and customs
smugglers are over. If law enforcement wishes to take advantage of the
benefits of forfeiture in the ordinary chores of daily law enforcement, it
99. The Court did not address cases where the Court sustained civil forfeitures of
property even though claimants had made showings that they were bona fide purchasers
for value of the property. See, e.g., United States v. Commercial Credit Co., 286 U.S.
63 (1932); United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398 (1814).
100. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2808.
101. Id. at2809 (citing Calero-Toledov. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
689-90 (1974) and J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512
(1921)).
102. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
103. Id. at 505; see United States v. $8850,461 U.S. 555,562 n.12 (1983); Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395
U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
104. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 505 (referring to Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589
(1931) (holding that IRS administrative preseizure procedures were adequate to allow for
seizure of property without a judicial hearing)).
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must assume the task of conforming nineteenth-century practices to
modem day constitutional and practical realities.
I. RECENT EFFORTS TO ABANDON TAINT PRINCIPLES
AS A LIMITATION ON CIVIL FORFEITURES

To some degree, the proper scope of civil forfeiture is a matter
properly committed to the discretion of legislative bodies, because they
enact laws that describe the specie of property that is subject to civil
forfeiture by reason of its relationship, or "nexus," to specified unlawful
activity."° Common statutory nexus provisions include property that
"facilitates"" ° certain offenses, or property that is used "in furtherance
of" unlawful activity,' or other similar limiting language. Hence,
resolving whether certain assets are subject to civil forfeiture will often
involve a factual inquiry into whether the asset's alleged use falls within
the "nexus" language chosen by the legislature.'
At some point, however, the nexus between property and criminal
conduct is so attenuated that it is simply not tainted by unlawful
conduct."w As is explained below, some states purport to authorize the
civil forfeiture of property not tainted by any direct connection to unlawful
conduct. 1 The purpose of such forfeitures is apparent; they attempt to
impose a sanction not on property but on a property owner for his
criminal conduct. It is here, at the edges of civil forfeiture law, that
current jurisprudence offers little guidance, largely because law
enforcement officials never before have attempted to stake a claim to civil
forfeiture authority in these outer reaches of forfeiture law. Old and timehonored, if not particularly compelling, civil forfeiture rationales such as
a property's "guilt in the wrong,"11 offer no support for extending the
scope of civil forfeiture beyond property either directly or indirectly used
in criminal conduct and thereby tainted.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See generally SMITH, supra note 64, 3.03.
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988).
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:64-la(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1994).
See SMnrH, supranote 64, 3.03, at 3-13.

109. See id. 3.03, at 3-15, 3-20 (citing United States v. 1974 Cadillac Eldorado
Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 427 (2d Cir. 1977)) ("The line [between property and criminal
conduct] must be drawn situation by situation."); see also United States v. 1972
Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F.2d 1026 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that the intended use of car
to transport proceeds of illicit sale did not by itself subject vehicle to forfeiture).
110. See infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text (discussing the merits of
Arizona's forfeiture law).
111. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921).
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The forfeiture of untainted property in a civil forfeiture action is not
aimed at guilty property but rather at guilty owners. In the words of
Justice Field, such a forfeiture seeks confiscation of property
without any reference to the uses to which the property is applied,
or the condition in which it is found, but whilst, so to speak, it
is innocent and passive, and removed at a distance from the
owner and the sphere of his action, on the ground of the personal
guilt of the owner .... 112
Here, also, the oft-invoked contention that "civil" forfeiture is merely
remedial is least persuasive while the punitive mission of such a forfeiture
is as transparent today as it was to Justice Field in 1870.
A. Arizona's Expansion of Civil Forfeiture to Reach Untainted Assets
Several states recently have broadened the statutory forfeiture
authority available to state law enforcement officials. Some states track
federal law in recognizing a distinction between criminal forfeiture
113
actions, with their potentially broader scope, and civil forfeitures.
Other states, most notably Arizona," 4 have abandoned the traditional
distinction between criminal and civil forfeitures. These states purport to
allow the imposition of civil forfeitures, with their reduced procedural
protections, on wholly untainted property. In short, these states authorize
the imposition of forfeitures of legitimate assets through civil forfeiture
proceedings rather than requiring compliance with the constitutional
protections applicable to criminal forfeitures under federal law.115
Initially, the failure of some states to adopt the long-held distinction
in federal law between civil and criminal forfeitures should not be
surprising.
Given that states never have exercised customs
responsibilities, states had no need to develop civil forfeiture as an
enforcement tool in the nineteenth century. Instead, states typically have
used civil forfeitures-in accordance with
their modem day rationale-as
116
an adjunct to criminal law enforcement.
112. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 323 (1870) (Field, J.,
dissenting).
113. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:64-1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994) (criminal
forfeiture) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:64-3 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994) (civil forfeiture).
114.
& Supp.
115.
116.

See ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-253, 13-2314(N), 13-4301 to 13-4315 (1989
1994-95).
E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314(D).
See SMITH, supra note 64, 3.03, at 3-15.
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The Arizona statute purports to be a logical extension of this trend,
and its advocates have described it as "a stride in the evolution of a 'civil
justice system' to complement the criminal justice system through judicial
intervention in antisocial behavior." 17 Furthermore, the proponents of
Arizona's statute allege that broad civil asset forfeiture statutes represent
"the leading edge of civil remedies for economic injustices." * '
Arizona's statute is attractive to state law enforcement because broadening
the scope of forfeiture while narrowing available procedural protections
will undoubtedly strengthen law enforcement. Absent a constitutional
barrier to this practice, its future seems bright.
In 1970, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) adopted forfeiture provisions for the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act (UCSA), which were patterned after federal forfeiture
laws. Accordingly, the UCSA forfeiture provision authorized only limited
civil forfeitures.11 9 During the late 1980s, however, the NCCUSL
considered, and ultimately enacted in 1990, a major comprehensive
revision to the UCSA.1 During this process, advocates of the Arizona
forfeiture model urged that it form the basis for all state forfeiture law.
This effort failed, but prosecution advocates renamed their work product
as the Model Asset Forfeiture Act (MASFA). 12 ' The MASFA purports
Specifically, it
to authorize the civil forfeiture of untainted assets."
proposes to incorporate two aspects of federal criminal forfeiture
law-substitute assets forfeiture and enterprise forfeiture-into the
permissible scope of civil forfeiture. The proposed inclusion of these
broad criminal forfeiture features into civil forfeiture law would herald a
new expansion in the scope of civil forfeiture into areas unsupported by
a taint rationale. In addition to lacking a foundation in civil forfeiture
doctrine, these expansions would have the effect of authorizing the
imposition of punitive sanctions without the numerous procedural
safeguards of the criminal process.

117. Cameron H. Holmes, History andPurposeofArizona ForfeitureUnderA.R.S.

§ 13-4301 et seq. (1986), reprintedby ABA National Institute on Forfeitures and Asset
Freezes (materials provided for ABA conference, Forfeitures and Asset Freezes: A
Comprehensive Survey of Asset Forfeiture, Restraints and Third-Party Rights, Wash.,
D.C., Dec. 3-4, 1990).
118. Id.
119. See SmrH, supranote 64, 3.03, at 3-14 n.4.
120. See STEVEN L. KESSLER, CrviL AND CRIMNAL FORFErruRE: FEDERAL AND
STATE PRACTICE app. J-3 (1993 & Supp. 1994).
121. MODEL AssaT FoRlErruRn ACT (1991).
122. Id.
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1. Substitute Asset Forfeiture
The proposed application of substitute asset forfeiture, a feature of
federal criminal forfeiture law, to state civil forfeiture law serves to
highlight the incongruity between forfeiture doctrine and the proposed
expansion. Substitute asset forfeiture is a form of forfeiture whereby the
government is authorized to seize legitimate untainted assets in lieu of
forfeitable assets. " First proposed by the Justice Department for
inclusion in the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984,11 substitute
asset forfeiture was viewed as a means of preventing a criminal defendant
from frustrating criminal forfeitures by the device of transferring or
dissipating assets prior to the entrance of a forfeiture judgment. 12
Substitute asset forfeiture was considered, in conjunction with the adoption
of the relation-back doctrine for criminal forfeitures, to be an important
means to strengthen the effectiveness of criminal forfeiture. 11
Congress, however, eliminated the proposed substitute asset language from
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 in conference committee
because of perceived constitutional problems, and opted to adopt an
alternative fine provision authorizing a fine of up to twice the amount of
criminal gain.12
In 1986, however, Congress enacted substitute asset forfeiture
provisions, but restricted their application to situations in which the
unavailability of forfeit assets at final judgment was caused by the acts or
omissions of the criminal defendant."
Thus, substitute asset
forfeiture-the forfeiture of untainted assets-was triggered only by the
improper conduct of a criminal defendant. Moreover, the need for
substitute asset forfeiture initially was predicated on the desire to preserve
the punitive impact of criminal forfeiture by denying a criminal defendant
the ability to thwart forfeiture prior to judgment.
The MASFA, however, enacts substitute asset forfeiture as a type of
civil forfeiture."
Unlike its federal counterpart, under the proposed
uniform state substitute asset forfeiture, liability is not conditioned on
123. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988).
124. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040.
125. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 201 (1983).
126. Id.
127. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 2301, 98
Stat. 1976, 2192.
128. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1153(a), 100 Stat.
3207, 3207-13 (codified as amended as part of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988)).
129. See MASFA § 517.
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some intentional or negligent conduct by a claimant or defendant that
places property out of reach."3 Rather, the claimant or defendant is
liable for unavailable property, regardless of fault, including liability for
any diminution in value. As a practical matter, the procedural differences
between civil and criminal forfeitures render the objective of substitute
asset forfeiture inapplicable to civil forfeitures. Civil forfeitures begin
with the seizure of the offending res, thus eliminating the opportunity for
it to be transferred by a claimant. Accordingly, there is no risk that the
res will be unavailable for any subsequent civil forfeiture judgment. The
problem of disappearing or dissipating assets occurs only in the context of
criminal forfeitures, where the government must first obtain a criminal
13
conviction before it is entitled to seize assets. '
Moreover, the implementation of substitute asset forfeiture in a civil
forfeiture context underscores its lack of doctrinal foundation. The res in
a civil forfeiture action serves not only to demarcate the court's
jurisdiction but also to limit the liability of any affected potential parties.
By contrast, with substitute asset forfeiture, potential claimants are created
beyond that identified in the litigation by the substitution of wholly licit
property for forfeiture purposes. Even from the perspective of the legal
fiction guiding civil forfeiture law, if civil forfeiture is justified as a
prosecution of an offending res, then it makes no sense to permit
satisfaction of such a claim against a non-guilty or untainted res.
In summary, applying substitute asset forfeiture to civil forfeitures
cannot be justified under a taint theory. Indeed, civil forfeitures are
premised on the principle that the guilt or innocence of property owners
is irrelevant to the prosecution of an independent civil forfeiture
action." 2 In short, lurking behind the articulated desire to impose
substitute asset forfeiture in civil in rem actions is the motivating impulse
to impose forfeiture in personam upon a guilty property owner, not upon
"guilty" property.

130. Compare id. with 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
131. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e) (1988). Of course, the federal governmentean
and does seekpretrial restraining orders in criminal forfeiture cases. See generally Reed,
supra note 53, at 760-68.
132. See, e.g., The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1827) ("IThe
proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by, any criminal
proceedings in personam.").

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

2. Enterprise Forfeiture
Enterprise forfeiture is a term coined from the lexicon of the federal
RICO and Continuing Criminal Enterprise statutes. 3
Under these
criminal statutes, a convicted defendant can be forced to forfeit not only
the profits of his crime, but also any assets that afford a defendant a
source of influence over the alleged "racketeer influenced and corrupt
organization" or drug enterprise."
Enterprise forfeiture is aimed at
purging the defendant from the enterprise and thus, in RICO cases,
eliminating the influence of organized crime from legitimate

businesses."

Enterprise forfeiture, however, is not predicated on a

taint theory, because it reaches wholly legitimate assets that are forfeited

in order to punish their owner."

Thus, enterprise forfeiture is the

quintessential type of criminal, in personam, forfeiture, because its

justifications le in the guilt of the owner, not of the property.
Nonetheless, the MASFA language includes enterprise forfeiture

within the substantive scope of civil forfeiture. 37 Again, all forfeiture
is characterized as civil, both in name and in procedure, in the

MASFA."

Accordingly,

the forfeiture of untainted assets via

enterprise forfeiture would be accomplished through civil forfeiture

procedures. Moreover, enterprise forfeiture, when pressed in federal
criminal prosecutions, has elicited widely-expressed concern from courts
about its potential to infringe on the Eighth Amendment rights of
defendants."' This has prompted a disavowal by the Justice Department

of any intent to seek any disproportionate criminal forfeiture." 4

Of

133. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988) (RICO statute defining "enterprise" as
including "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity").
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); United States v. Porcelli,
865 F.2d 1352, 1363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989).
135. See Porcelli, 865 F.2d at 1362-63; see also Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The
Crime of Being Criminal, PartsI & HI, 87 CoLUm L. REv. 661, 709 (1987).
136. United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1413 (9th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1477 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d
1322, 1349-50, reh'gdenied, 714 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005
(1984).
137. MASFA § 4(e).
138. See, e.g., id. §§ 6, 11-13.
139. See, e.g., Porcelli, 865 F.2d at 1364-66; Busher, 817 F.2d at 1414-15.
140. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. ATrORNEYS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ATT'Y'S MANUAL § 9-110.414 (1992). The section reads, in pertinent
part:
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course, if the civil label attached to enterprise forfeiture under the
MASFA was given effect, federal precedent would suggest that the Eighth
Amendment poses no obstacle to civil forfeiture regardless of its
magnitude. Such a broad scope of forfeiture, however, could not possibly
be justified under a taint rationale, because enterprise forfeiture is not
premised on taint.
IV. CRIMINAL VS. CIVIL SANCTIONS
Implicit in the contention that all forfeitures can be characterized as
"civil" is the assumption that the confiscation of an owner's property for
his criminal conduct is fairly described as a remedial and nonpunitive
sanction. The Arizona forfeiture statute makes this assumption explicit,
declaring that a forfeiture action "is remedial and not punitive." 4 ' As
applied to the forfeiture of untainted assets, such a contention is
contradicted by approximately two centuries of federal forfeiture
precedent. 42 Accordingly, if federal forfeiture principles and their
common law ancestors, govern the issue, the punitive label would attach
to such a sanction, thereby triggering the multiple constitutional
protections that attend the imposition of such a sanction.
Wholly apart from federal forfeiture law and its peculiar history,
however, the same punitive classification is obtained when the forfeiture
of untainted assets is analyzed as a question of the proper constitutional
characterization of such a government sanction. The dividing line between
criminal and civil prosecutions by the government has never been
especially bright. The Supreme Court has attempted to provide general
lines of demarcation, but its views have been unclear, and at times,
inconsistent. Nonetheless, the Court has offered some general guidance.
The traditional test to determine whether federal legislation is penal
The
in character was set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.'
Court outlined the following criteria:
Whether the sanction [1] involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only upon a finding
In deciding whether forfeiture ... is appropriate, the [Organized Crime and
Racketeering] Section will consider the nature and severity of the offense; the
government's policy is not to seek the fullest forfeiture permissible under the
law where that forfeiture would be disproportionate to the defendant's crime.
Id.
141. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2314(N) (1989 & Supp. 1994-95).
142. See supraPart I1.
143. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned .... 14
These seven factors are not exhaustive" and "may often point in
differing directions.""
Nonetheless, the Mendoza-Martinez factors
constitute the definitive test for characterizing a statute as either penal or
civil. Again, as the scope of "civil" forfeiture legislation moves beyond
tainted assets to encompass legitimate assets, either under substitute asset
forfeiture or enterprise forfeiture, the case for a criminal label is
strengthened under the Mendoza-Martinez factors. Moreover, as the
Austin opinion makes clear, once a forfeiture becomes so punitive as to
satisfy the Mendoza-Martinez factors, "protections associated with criminal
eases may apply to a civil forfeiture proceeding." 47
For example, the forfeiture of legitimately acquired or maintained
assets certainly qualifies as an affirmative disability. In the MendozaMartinez opinion, the Supreme Court offered as examples of such
affirmative disabilities legislation which had excluded alleged subversives
from government employmente4 and the exclusion of former
Confederates from federal court practice."4
Deprivation of lawfully
obtained property is similar enough to qualify as an affirmative disability.
Also, because the forfeiture of untainted property has historically been
regarded as punishment, dating back as far as feudal times, the second
Mendoza-Martinez factor points to a punitive label. Accordingly, the first
two Mendoza-Martinez factors weigh in favor of a punitive classification
for the forfeiture of legitimate assets.
The need for a finding of scienter, the third Mendoza-Martinez
factor, 1" is difficult to apply in this context.
Traditionally, the
144. Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
145. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 250 (1980).
146. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169.
147. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2804 n.4 (1993).
148. See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168 n.22 (citing United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946) (invalidating § 304 of The Urgent Deficiency Appropriation
Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 132, 57 Stat. 431, 450, which prohibited payment of salaries
of government employees designated subversive by the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities)).
149. See Ex ParteGarland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
150. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168.
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forfeiture of untainted property has required a finding of
scienter-criminal mens rea; however, here the government eludes such
a burden by simply eliminating intent as a relevant issue in their civil
forfeiture case-in-chief. The loss of the property to forfeiture, absent
proof of a statutory claim of "innocence," certainly injects the issue of
scienter into a civil forfeiture proceeding. That is, the stigma inherent in
a finding of scienter is clearly present."'
Most certainly, given that the avowed purposes of this expansion of
forfeiture law are to further the objectives of criminal enforcement, its
"operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment, retribution and
deterrence." 152 In addition, there can be no doubt that "the behavior to
which it applies. is already a crime," thus pointing153to a punitive
characterization under the fifth Mendoza-Martinez factor.
The sixth Mendoza-Martinez factor, whether an alternative purpose
can rationally be assigned to the sanction of forfeiture of legitimate assets,
is not as easily answered. Advocates of such civil forfeiture contend that
it furthers criminal enforcement objectives; however, they offer no
"alternative purpose" justifying a nonpunitive assessment. Proponents of
civil forfeiture of legitimate assets, on the other hand, urge that it does
have an alternative purpose. For example, according to a representative
of the Arizona Attorney General's office, the "fundamental purpose [of
the Arizona statute] is 'social engineering' accomplished through
government intercession in commercial activity harmful to the economy
as a whole.""

With such a broad charter, it is hard to imagine any

sanction that could not be so justified.
Stripped to its essentials, however, the civil forfeiture of legitimate
assets still depends for its raison d'etre on the need to deter or punish
criminal conduct of the property owner. Nor can the societal need to
deter negligence by property owners, a historic rationale for some civil
forfeitures,155 be ascribed as a purpose justifying civil forfeiture of
legitimate assets; if assets have no nexus to criminal activity, then their
owner has not been negligent in their supervision.
151. Id. (citing Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 610-12 (1903)).
152. Id.

153. See id.
154. See Holmes, supra note 117.
155. Under English common law, the law of deodand mandated forfeiture of
property that caused the death of another. See Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox:

Some HistoricalPerspectiveson Deodand,Forfeitures, Wrongful Death, andthe Western
Notion ofSovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 180-81 (1973). The purpose of deodand was
to deter negligence by property owners. Deodand was abolished in England in 1846.
Id. at 170-74. See also 77 J. HANSARD, PARLiAmENTARY DEBATES 1031 (1845).
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A tabulation of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, therefore, strongly
suggests that the "civil" forfeiture of legitimate assets falls on the criminal
side of the constitutional scales. This conclusion is further buttressed by
recent forays of the Supreme Court in its evolving attempt to distinguish
between criminal and civil sanctions.'
Finally, language from both the majority and concurring opinions in
Austin v. United States offers support for the contention that untainted
assets are not subject to civil forfeiture."
The majority in Austin
rejected the government's argument that by removing property that is not
contraband, but nonetheless constitutes the "instruments" of drug crimes,
civil forfeiture serves a "remedial" purpose."' The Austin majority held
that the forfeitures sought in that case-real property, which had allegedly
"facilitated" a drug offense-were no more the "instruments" of crime
than was the automobile used to convey illegal liquor in One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania.'59 In other words, the Austin majority
found no remedial purpose served by the forfeiture of property which was
not contraband. This, of course, does not mean that the forfeiture of
facilitation property is impermissible or unconstitutional. It does mean,
however, that when one moves one step further from crime-from
forfeiting facilitation property to forfeiting wholly legitimate property
unrelated to crime-the claim for a characterization of the government's
forfeiture as "remedial" is virtually untenable.
By far the most compelling argument against the civil forfeiture of
substitute assets lies in the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia in
Austin."W Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that the civil forfeiture
of noncontraband property must be deemed punitive for Eighth
Amendment purposes. 161 He suggested, however, that "an in rem
forfeiture goes beyond the traditional limits that the Eighth Amendment
permits if it applies to property that cannot properly be regarded as an
instrumentality of the offense-the building, for example, in which an
isolated drug sale happens to occur."16 Instrumentalities are properly
156. See supra Part H.
157. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2809 (1993) (Blackmnun, J.,
delivering the opinion of the Court); id. at 2814 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at 2816 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
158. Id. at 2811.
159. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
160. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
161. Id. at 2814-15 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
162. Id. at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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forfeited, however, regardless of their value, if the "confiscated property
has a close enough relationship to the offense.""
In other words,
Justice Scalia would sustain a large forfeiture from an Eighth Amendment
challenge for excessiveness if the relationship between the property and
the offense was sufficiently close to make the property tainted or "guilty"
under traditional standards. According to Justice Scalia, "our cases
suggest a similar instrumentality inquiry when considering the permissible
scope of a statutory forfeiture." 1 '
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Austin embodies a reaffirmation
of the taint doctrine of, and justification for, civil forfeiture. Under his
reasoning, the civil forfeiture of wholly legitimate assets-which by
definition have no connection to criminal activities-would appear to
constitute an Eighth Amendment violation per se. As this article suggests,
limiting civil forfeitures to tainted property, or the "instrumentalities" of
crime, is also consistent with traditional forfeiture precedent. Of course,
if the Eighth Amendment precludes the civil forfeiture of lawful property
unrelated to crime, then state and federal legislators are prohibited from
authorizing such a practice.
V. CONCLUSION

Historically, forfeiture has been an effective law enforcement weapon,
beginning with customs laws and extending to criminal laws. In many
ways, civil forfeiture, with its diminished procedural protections, is a
peculiar legal doctrine formed out of a desire to further enforcement
objectives at the expense of the wide-ranging constitutional protections of
our criminal jurisprudence. Recognizing this tension, the Supreme Court
long ago gave such civil forfeitures of tainted assets the special status of
"quasi-criminal," thereby justifying imposition of some, but not all, of the
constitutional safeguards incident to criminal prosecutions. 1"
Today, motivated by a desire for enhanced enforcement, some states
have attempted to push civil forfeitures beyond their historical and legal
limits by imposing broad forfeitures on untainted assets by means of civil
procedures. Such an effort runs counter to two centuries of forfeiture
precedent and to the evolving distinction between civil and criminal
sanctions drawn by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Constitution
will not tolerate the civil forfeiture of untainted legitimate assets, however
well-intentioned the effort.

163. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
164. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
165. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.

